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I. INTRODUCTION 
Mark Lyttle is a brown-skinned, North Carolina-born U.S. citizen.1  In 
2008, an immigration judge ordered Mark removed to Mexico, finding the 
government had proven with “clear, unequivocal, and convincing” 
evidence that he was an “alien,” not a U.S. citizen.2  Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement then flew Mark in handcuffs and shackles to 
Hidalgo, Texas, where he was ordered to walk across a bridge into Mexico, 
his only belongings being the clothes on his back and a deportation order 
for “Jose Thomas.”3  Mark tried to reenter the United States three times; 
however, border patrol officers repeatedly turned him away and threatened 
him with prison time if he returned.4  Mark spent the next four and a half 
months in Mexico, Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala, 
surviving in shelters, immigration camps, and eventually a Honduran jail.5  
Through the help of a consular office in Honduras, Mark obtained a U.S. 
passport; only then was he finally allowed to return to his country.6 
Mark is one of the nearly half a million people removed from the 
United States every year7—thousands of whom are estimated to be U.S. 
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 1.   Jacqueline Stevens, U.S. Government Unlawfully Detaining and Deporting U.S. Citizens as 
Aliens, 18 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 606, 674 (2011). 
 2.   William Finnegan, The Deportation Machine, THE NEW YORKER (April 29, 2013), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2013/04/29/the-deportation-machine (reporting that “[t]he 
exact reasons for the [prison] intake clerk’s mistakes are unknown—the clerk’s identity is itself 
unknown—but the vagaries of race and ethnicity obviously played a part.”); see also Stevens, supra 
note 1, at 674. 
 3.   Stevens, supra note 1, at 674. 
 4.   Id. at 675; see 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (2012) (establishing criminal penalties for reentry of 
certain noncitizens, including fines, imprisonment up to 10 years, or both). 
 5.   Stevens, supra note 1, at 675. 
 6.   Id. at 675–76. 
 7.   Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., DHS Releases End of Fiscal Year 2015 
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citizens.8  Nearly a quarter million of these removals are based on an 
immigration judge’s finding that the government provided “clear, 
unequivocal, and convincing” evidence that the person in removal 
proceedings is an “alien,” not a U.S. citizen.9 
But despite how often this standard of proof is applied—nearly 500 
times every business day of the year in immigration court alone—existing 
literature on standards of proof has not examined how stringent the “clear, 
unequivocal, and convincing” standard is.10  Instead, commentators have 
almost uniformly accepted that there are only three standards of proof—
preponderance, clear and convincing, and reasonable doubt—and in doing 
so, they have assumed, without analyzing, that the “clear, unequivocal, 
and convincing” standard is the same as the intermediate, “clear and 
convincing” standard.11 
                                                          
Statistics (Dec. 22, 2015) [hereinafter “DHS Press Release”], https://www.dhs.gov/news/ 
2015/12/22/dhs-releases-end-fiscal-year-2015-statistics (reporting that in fiscal year 2015, the 
Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) removed 462,463 individuals from the United States). 
 8.   See Stevens, supra note 1, at 629–30 (based on original empirical research, estimating that 
from 2003–2011, “ICE has incarcerated over 20,000 U.S. citizens, and deported thousands more”); 
Michael R. Strain, Donald Trump’s Immigration Plan Would Cause U.S. Citizens To Be Deported, 
WASH. POST (Nov. 12, 2015) (citing id. and AARTI KOHLI, PETER L. MARKOWITZ AND LISA CHAVEZ, 
SECURE COMMUNITIES BY THE NUMBERS: AN ANALYSIS OF DEMOGRAPHICS AND DUE PROCESS 
(2011), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Secure_Communities_by_the_Numbers.pdf), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/11/12/donald-trumps-immigration-plan-
would-cause-u-s-citizens-to-be-deported/ (estimating that based on current data that every year “over 
100,000 U.S. citizens [are] mistakenly apprehended, some of whom may end up deported”); Laura 
Murray-Tjan, When Will We Stop Deporting U.S. Citizens?, HUFFPOST (Sept. 2013, 3:03 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/laura-murraytjan/when-will-we-stop-deporti_b_3942843.html (“I 
reveal no great secrets when I say that the United States has deported its own citizens numerous 
times.”). 
 9.    Brief of Amici Curiae Florence Immigrant and Refugee Rights Project and The Thomas & 
Mack Legal Clinic, Univ. of Nev. L.V., William S. Boyd School of Law at 10, Mondaca-Vega v. 
Lynch, 137 S. Ct. 36 (2016) (No. 15-1153) 2016 WL 1579993 at *10 [hereinafter “FIRRP Amicus 
Brief”] (“In fiscal year 2015 alone, immigration judges found the government met th[e] ‘exacting’ 
[clear, unequivocal, and convincing] standard in over 124,500 cases”); See also Woodby v. INS, 385 
U.S. 276, 277 (1966) (“[I]t is incumbent upon the Government in such proceedings to establish the 
facts supporting deportability by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence.”); Mondaca-Vega v. 
Lynch, 808 F.3d 413, 420 (9th Cir. 2015) (observing that the government’s burden to prove alienage 
is “clear, unequivocal, and convincing”), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 36 (2016); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.46 (2017) 
(requiring “clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the facts alleged as grounds for 
deportation are true”). 
 10.   See DHS Press Release, supra note 7. 
 11.   See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont, Standards of Proof in Japan and the United States, 37 
CORNELL INT’L L.J. 263, 268–69 (2004) (“Today the U.S. law seems indeed to limit the choice to no 
more than these three standards from among the range of probabilities stretching from more-likely-
than-not to virtual-certainty.  The law did not always recognize this limitation, but with time the law 
acknowledged that the conceivable spectrum of standards had coalesced irresistibly into three.”); 
Christoph Engel, Preponderance of the Evidence Versus Intime Conviction: A Behavioral Perspective 
on a Conflict Between American and Continental European Law, 33 VT. L. REV. 435, 435 (2009) 
(“American law has three different standards of proof.”); John Gamino, Tax Controversy 
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This gap in the scholarship reflects a similar gap in our case law.  But 
that is changing.  In 2015, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals sitting en 
banc addressed this issue of first impression, and by a narrow majority, 
held that immigration law’s “clear, unequivocal, and convincing” standard 
is simply another formulation of the intermediate “clear and convincing” 
standard familiar to civil law.12  This holding created a circuit split with 
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals—the only other circuit court to address 
this issue—which held in 2013 that the “clear, unequivocal, and 
convincing” standard is a higher standard of proof than the “clear and 
convincing” standard.13  In 2016, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to 
resolve this circuit split; therefore, the remaining ten circuit courts must 
now grapple with this issue individually.14 
Like the scholars who have examined standards of proof, the Ninth 
Circuit’s decision is rooted in the belief that there are only three 
evidentiary standards; that is, there are only two evidentiary standards in 
civil proceedings, and one in criminal proceedings.15  This Article 
challenges that belief.  It argues for the first time in an academic piece that 
immigration law’s “clear, unequivocal, and convincing” standard is a 
more stringent standard than the “clear and convincing” standard, and 
therefore, “clear, unequivocal, and convincing” evidence signifies a third 
civil standard of proof. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II provides an overview of 
standards of proof.  Part III provides background on the “clear, 
unequivocal, and convincing” standard in immigration law.  It then argues 
that pursuant to U.S. Supreme Court precedent, the Immigration and 
Nationality Act, and canons of statutory interpretation, this standard is 
unequivocally different than the “clear and convincing” standard.  In 
support of this argument, Part IV examines the numerous policy 
considerations that further show this heightened standard is not only 
                                                          
Overburdened, A Critique of Heightened Standards of Proof, 59 TAX LAW. 497, 508 (2006) (“For the 
purpose of . . . civil actions[,] there are two standards of proof—only two.”); see also Gary Lawson, 
Proving the Law, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 859, 871 (1992) (discussing the continuum, but analyzing only 
three standards of proof); Michael Barzee, Comment, Fifteen Years and Counting: The Past, Present, 
and Future of Missouri’s Sexually Violent Predator Act, 82 UMKC L. REV. 513, 531 (2014) (same); 
Frank LaSalle, Comment, The Civil False Claims Act: The Need for a Heightened Burden of Proof as 
a Prerequisite for Forfeiture, 28 AKRON L. REV. 497, 529 (1995) (same). 
 12.   Mondaca-Vega, 808 F.3d at 420. 
 13.   Ward v. Holder, 733 F.3d 601, 605 (6th Cir. 2013) (“The ‘clear, unequivocal, and 
convincing’ standard is a more demanding degree of proof than the ‘clear and convincing’ standard.”).  
The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) reached the same finding in 1988.  Matter of Patel, 19 I. 
& N. Dec. 774, 783 (BIA 1988). 
 14.   Mondaca-Vega v. Lynch, 137 S. Ct. 36 (2016). 
 15.   Mondaca-Vega, 808 F.3d at 422 (finding “[t]he Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized 
that there are three burdens of proof” and that “[t]hree is enough”). 
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practical, but it is also necessary to ensure immigration courts reach sound, 
fair holdings, particularly in cases where one’s U.S. citizenship is at stake. 
II. AN OVERVIEW OF STANDARDS OF PROOF 
This Part begins by explaining the important function standards of 
proof serve in our judicial system.  Next, it examines the three standards 
of proof courts and scholars most commonly recognize, in addition to 
noting several less traditional standards of proof factfinders commonly 
employ.  Finally, it summarizes empirical research on whether a standard’s 
formulation impacts the outcome of a case. 
A. A Standard’s Purpose 
Before addressing the standards of proof and the functions they serve, 
it is important to first distinguish the term “standard of proof” from the 
broader term, “burden of proof.”16  The burden of proof generally 
encompasses three components: (1) the burden of production, (2) the 
burden of persuasion, and (3) the standard of proof.17  The burden of 
production identifies which party must go forward with evidence on a 
particular issue raised in litigation; that is, the burden of production 
identifies who bears “the obligation to make a prima facie case.”18  The 
burden of persuasion, by contrast, is the “ultimate obligation on a party to 
persuade the decision maker that the party should prevail on a contested 
issue.”19  In civil litigation, the plaintiff usually bears the burden of 
persuasion and production on all elements of a claim, while the defendant 
bears the burden of persuasion on all elements of affirmative defenses.20 
While these two components determine which party must go forward 
with evidence, the standard of proof measures the sufficiency of that 
evidence.21  That is, the standard of proof reflects the “degree of certainty 
required for a judge or jury to find for a party on an issue.”22  Thus, “the 
term ‘standard of proof’ specifies how difficult it will be for the party 
                                                          
 16.   2 Charles Tilford McCormick, McCormick on Evidence § 342, at 675 (7th ed. 2013) 
(observing that in the family of legal terms, the “slipperiest” member is the term, “burden of proof”). 
 17.   David L. Schwartz, Christopher B. Seaman, Standards of Proof in Civil Litigation: An 
Experiment from Patent Law, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 429, 433–34 (2013) (citation omitted). 
 18.   Id. at 434 (citation omitted). 
 19.   Id. (citation omitted). 
 20.   Id. (citation omitted). 
 21.   Id. at 433–34 (citations omitted). 
 22.   Id. at 433 (citation omitted). 
2018 UNEQUIVOCALLY DIFFERENT 569 
bearing the burden of persuasion to convince the jury of the facts in its 
favor.”23  The standard of proof is the focus of this Article. 
The standard of proof is a cornerstone of our legal system because of 
the important functions it serves.24  For example, in litigation, there is 
always a risk that the factfinder will reach an incorrect decision; the 
standard of proof allocates this risk between the parties based on the 
importance of the rights at stake.25  Consequently, the greater the value 
society places on the right at stake, the more stringent the standard of 
proof.26 
Because the weight society places on the outcome of a particular case 
varies significantly, the Supreme Court refers to the standard of proof as a 
“continuum,” ranging from low to high probabilities of certainty.27  A 
continuum is “a continuous sequence in which adjacent elements are not 
perceptibly different from each other, [yet] the extremes are quite 
distinct.”28  The various types of standards of proof are discussed below. 
B. The Three Standards 
Because the standard of proof often serves to protect litigants’ due 
process rights and other constitutionally protected interests, the Supreme 
Court has traditionally been the branch to establish which standard of 
proof is required in a given case.29  In doing so, the Court has generally 
recognized three standards of proof.30  Although the Court has never 
suggested that factfinders are limited to only those three standards, 
scholars, and recently the Ninth Circuit, have reached that conclusion.31  
                                                          
 23.   Id. at 434 (quoting Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership, 564 U.S. 91, 100 n.4 (2011)). 
 24.   Id. at 435; Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 520 (1958) (observing that “the outcome of a 
lawsuit—and hence the vindication of legal rights—depends more often on how the factfinder 
appraises the facts than on a disputed construction of a statute or interpretation of a line of 
precedents”). 
 25.   Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (“The standard serves to allocate the risk of 
error between the litigants and to indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimate decision.”). 
 26.   In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (the standard of proof 
“represents an attempt to instruct the factfinder concerning the degree of confidence our society thinks 
[the factfinder] should have in the correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of 
adjudication”). 
 27.   See, e.g., Addington, 441 U.S. at 423. 
 28.   Continuum, OXFORD AM. COLLEGE DICTIONARY 300 (2002). 
 29.   Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 284 (1966) (“[T]he question of what degree of proof is 
required in [a] proceeding . . . is the kind of question which has traditionally been left to the judiciary 
to resolve.”). 
 30.   Addington, 441 U.S. at 423 (“Generally speaking, the evolution of this area of the law has 
produced across a continuum three standards or levels of proof for different types of cases.”). 
 31.   See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text. 
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From the lowest to highest degree of probability, these three standards are: 
(1) preponderance of the evidence, (2) clear and convincing, and (3) 
beyond a reasonable doubt.32 
The preponderance of the evidence standard is employed in most civil 
suits.33  Under this standard, the plaintiff prevails when its claim is “more 
likely [true] than not.”34  In quantified terms, a preponderance requires 
more than a fifty percent probability.35  This standard allocates the risk of 
error to both parties in a “roughly [even]” fashion,” thereby reflecting 
society’s minimal interest in the outcome of monetary disputes between 
private parties.36 
On the opposite end of the continuum is the “beyond a reasonable 
doubt” standard, which is constitutionally mandated for conviction in 
criminal cases.37  This standard requires a probability of approximately 
ninety percent or higher.38  Thus, this standard allocates almost all of the 
risk of error to the government, not only because the rights at stake in 
criminal cases are of a “transcending value,” but also because of society’s 
utmost interest in the correct adjudication of our criminal laws.39  Notably, 
this standard is commonly assumed to apply in criminal proceedings only; 
however, it is applied in some civil proceedings too, such as when deciding 
                                                          
 32.   Addington, 441 U.S. at 423–24. 
 33.   Id. at 423. 
 34.   Salem v. Holder, 647 F.3d 111, 116 (4th Cir. 2011) (finding the party bearing the burden of 
proving the preponderance of the evidence loses if it cannot demonstrate that a fact is “more likely 
than not”), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1110 (2012). 
 35.   United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 403–04 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (citing United States v. 
Schipani, 289 F. Supp. 43, 56 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), aff’d, 414 F.2d 1262 (2d Cir. 1969) and MAGUIRE ET 
AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON EVIDENCE, 871–73 (6th ed. 1973)). 
 36.   Engel, supra note 11, at 439 (quoting Addington, 441 U.S. at 423). 
 37.   Barbara D. Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of Justice: Burdens of Persuasion in 
Criminal Cases, 86 YALE L. J. 1299, 1301 (1977). 
 38.   Fatico, 458 F. Supp. at 411 (quoting W. BLACKSTONE, THE LAW OF ENGLAND, BOOK THE 
FOURTH 358 (T. Wait and Co., Portland 1807)) (“It is better that ten guilty persons escape than one 
innocent suffer [sic].”). 
 39.   Addington, 441 U.S. at 423–24 (“In a criminal case, . . . the interests of the defendant are of 
such magnitude that historically and without any explicit constitutional requirement they have been 
protected by standards of proof designed to exclude as nearly as possible the likelihood of an erroneous 
judgment.”); see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (“[U]se of the reasonable-doubt 
standard is indispensable to command the respect and confidence of the community in applications of 
the criminal law.  It is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by a standard of 
proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned.”); Speiser v. Randall, 
357 U.S. 513, 525–26 (1958) (“There is always in litigation a margin of error, representing error in 
factfinding, which both parties must take into account.  Where one party has at stake an interest of 
transcending value—as a criminal defendant his liberty—this margin of error is reduced as to him by 
the process of placing on the other party the burden of . . . persuading the factfinder at the conclusion 
of the trial of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
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petitions for civil commitment and in delinquency proceedings against 
juveniles.40 
Between the preponderance and the reasonable doubt standards is the 
“clear and convincing” standard.41  As the Supreme Court has observed, 
the formulation of this standard varies; it “usually employs some 
combination of the words ‘clear,’ ‘cogent,’ ‘unequivocal’ and 
‘convincing[.]’”42  This standard requires a probability of over seventy 
percent.43  By definition, it requires “an abiding conviction that the truth 
of [the] factual contentions” at issue are “highly probable.”44  Courts 
reserve this standard for special civil cases involving important individual 
interests that are “more substantial than mere loss of money,” such as 
petitions for involuntary civil commitment, petitions to withhold or 
withdraw life-sustaining treatment, petitions to terminate parental rights, 
and cases involving the forcible medication of a non-dangerous detainee.45  
This standard is also employed in certain civil cases where moral 
wrongdoing is implied, such as in libel, fraud, undue influence, parol, or 
constructive trust suits.46 
                                                          
 40.   Elizabeth Cloud, Note, Constitutional Law—First Amendment and Freedom of Thought—
Banishing Sex Offenders: Seventh Circuit Upholds Sex Offender’s Ban from Public Parks After 
Thinking Obscene Thoughts About Children, 28 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 119, 125 (2005) (“In 
In re Winship, the Court applied the ‘proof beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard to a civil proceeding 
for the first time, citing the substantial deprivation of liberty as a major factor in doing so. The 
reasonable doubt standard has since been adopted by many jurisdictions for deciding civil commitment 
cases.” (citations omitted)). 
 41.   Clear and Convincing Evidence, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“This is a 
greater burden than preponderance of the evidence, the standard applicable in most civil trials, but less 
than evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, the norm for criminal trials”). 
 42.   Addington, 441 U.S. at 424; Candice T. Player, Involuntary Outpatient Commitment: The 
Limits of Prevention, 26 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 159, 170 n.57 (2015) (observing that although 
“Addington left the term ‘clear and convincing evidence’ undefined; . . . lower courts have defined 
clear and convincing evidence as evidence that makes the existence of a fact ‘highly probable,’ or 
‘much more probable than its falsity’”). 
 43.   Fatico, 458 F. Supp. at 405 (“Quantified, the probabilities might be in the order of above 
70% under a clear and convincing evidence burden.”). 
 44.   Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 316 (1984). 
 45.   Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747–48 (1982) (quoting Addington, 441 U.S. at 424) 
(applying the standard to termination of parental rights); Addington, 441 U.S. at 432–33 (applying the 
standard to civil commitment); United States v. Ruiz-Gaxiola, 623 F.3d 684, 692 (9th Cir. 2010) 
(applying the standard to forcible medication of non-dangerous detainees). 
 46.   See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 331–32 (1974) (applying the standard 
to libel); Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285 n.18 (1966) (noting this standard’s use in fraud, undue 
influence, parol, and constructive trust cases); Collins Sec. Corp. v. SEC, 562 F.2d 820, 824–26 (D.C. 
Cir. 1977) (applying the standard to securities fraud). 
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C. The Outliers 
In addition to the three standards above, additional evidentiary 
standards of proof exist; however, these standards have been either ignored 
in standards of proof literature or characterized as variations of one of the 
three core standards.  For example, “substantial, credible” evidence is a 
standard of proof courts employ in some administrative law actions and in 
disputed citizenship hearings made pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1255(b)(5)(B).47  
This standard is usually a standard of review.48  However, courts, including 
the Supreme Court, have employed it as a standard of proof and have 
found it requires only “more than a mere scintilla,” which is less proof 
than required by the preponderance standard.49 
Similarly, the “strong-basis-in-evidence” standard also requires less 
proof than the preponderance standard.50  The Supreme Court first 
announced this standard in Ricci v. DeStefano, a Title VII employment law 
case, in 2009.51  Notably, one scholar has argued that this standard 
represents a new standard of proof in civil cases.52 
Finally, immigration courts routinely apply the “clear, unequivocal, 
and convincing” standard, the focus of this Article.  Immigration judges 
employ this standard to determine whether an individual is a removable 
“alien,” whether a lawful permanent resident is inadmissible, and whether 
a person absent from his final removal hearing was provided adequate 
notice of his removal hearing.53  One surveyed panel of judges found that 
                                                          
 47.   Pacific Micronesia Corp. v. NLRB, 219 F.3d 661, 665 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Boateng v. Holder, 
No. CV13–00631–PHX–DGC, 2013 WL 5353003 at *2 (D. Ariz. Sept. 25, 2013) (finding “Petitioner 
bears the initial burden of producing ‘substantial credible evidence in support of his citizenship 
claim’”). 
 48.   Edwin A. Bayo & John R. Rimes, Who Goes First and What is “Competent, Substantial 
Evidence” in a Proposed Rule Challenge?, 73 FLA. B.J. 62, 63 (1999) (“As has long been recognized, 
‘competent, substantial evidence’ is traditionally a standard of review, not an evidentiary standard.”). 
 49.   Pacific Micronesia Corp., 219 F.3d at 665 (“To meet the requirement of ‘substantial 
evidence,’ the Board must produce ‘more than a mere scintilla’ of evidence . . . .” (quoting 
Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938))). 
 50.   Herman N. (Rusty) Johnson, Jr., The Evolving Strong-Basis-In-Evidence Standard, 32 
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 347, 349–50 (2011). 
 51.   557 U.S. 557, 563 (2009) (“We conclude that race-based action like the City’s in this case 
is impermissible under Title VII unless the employer can demonstrate a strong basis in evidence that, 
had it not taken the action, it would have been liable under the disparate-impact statute.”). 
 52.   Johnson, supra note 50, 349–50, 350 n.5 (“[T]he strong-basis-in-evidence standard 
represents a new burden of persuasion in civil cases involving Ricci-type, disparate impact issues. I 
will demonstrate that the strong-basis-in-evidence standard should be interpreted as incurring a lesser 
burden than the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard.” (footnote omitted) (citing Christine 
Caulfield, Firefighter Ruling Gives Foggy Answers at Best, LAW360 (June 30, 2009, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.law360.com/employment/articles/108825)). 
 53.   See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5) (2012) (requiring the standard in absentia removal proceedings); 
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in contrast to the “clear and convincing” standard’s required probability of 
seventy percent, the “clear, unequivocal, and convincing” standard 
requires a probability of approximately eighty percent or greater.54  
Commentators, however, uniformly assume that the “clear, unequivocal, 
and convincing” standard is simply another formulation of the “clear and 
convincing” standard.55  This Article’s analysis of this standard therefore 
fills a gap in literature. 
D. The Proven Importance of a Standard’s Formulation 
Existing standards of proof scholarship and empirical research both 
show that the words the Supreme Court uses to explain the standard of 
proof are significant for two reasons.56  As a starting point, the Supreme 
Court’s original formulation of a standard—rather than its subsequent, 
simplified formulations of that standard—is essential to determining what 
degree of proof the Court intended for that standard to require.57  For 
example, when originally enunciating the reasonable doubt standard, the 
Court commonly added the following dependent clauses to explain the 
meaning of “reasonable doubt”: “not a vague conjecture,” “‘not a 
capricious and speculative doubt,” “not an arbitrary doubt,” “not a trivial 
doubt,” “not a mere possible doubt,” and “not an imaginary doubt.”58  Over 
time, however, the meaning of reasonable doubt has been sufficiently 
established in American jurisprudence, and consequently, the Court no 
longer uses these dependent clauses, referring to the standard simply as 
requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt.59  This illustrates not only that 
a standard’s formulation may evolve over time—even when the requisite 
degree of belief does not—but also that the dependent clauses the Court 
uses to explain a standard are vital to understanding its originally intended 
stringency. 
Empirical studies also show that the formulation of a standard affects 
the outcome of a case.  For example, in the most recent study on the impact 
                                                          
Mondaca-Vega, 808 F.3d at 417 (employing this standard to determine alienage); Ward v. Holder, 733 
F.3d 601 (6th Cir. 2013) (employing this standard to inadmissibility of lawful permanent resident). 
 54.   United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 405 (1978) (“In terms of percentages, the 
probabilities for clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence might be in the order of above 80% under 
this standard.”). 
 55.   See supra note 11. 
 56.   See, e.g., Schwartz & Seaman, supra note 17, at 437–41 (providing overview of all past 
survey and experimental studies on standards of proof). 
 57.   J.P. McBaine, Burden of Proof: Degrees of Belief, 32 CAL. L. REV. 242, 256 (1944). 
 58.   Id. at 257. 
 59.   See, e.g., Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243, 2248 (2016). 
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of standard formulation, two Harvard scholars tested whether the Supreme 
Court’s addition of a single-sentence jury instruction in Microsoft Corp. v. 
i4i Ltd. Partnership (“i4i”), affected the degree of belief required under 
the “clear and convincing” standard.60  The study found that the addition 
of this special jury instruction counterintuitively lowered the standard of 
proof required, making it statistically indistinguishable from the 
preponderance standard—the very standard the Court rejected in i4i.61  
Therefore, this study, like others before it, concluded that the formulation 
of a standard makes a “substantial impact” on factfinders’ decisions.62  
Given that accurate formulations of a standard may impact the outcome 
of the case, it necessarily follows that inaccurate formulations may as 
well. 
III. REASONABLE DOUBT’S CIVIL COUNTERPART: IMMIGRATION LAW’S 
“CLEAR, UNEQUIVOCAL, AND CONVINCING” STANDARD 
Part II established that standards of proof serve an important function 
in our legal system by signaling to the trier of fact the value society has 
placed on the correctness of the case’s outcome.  It also demonstrated that 
courts already employ at least four standards of proof in civil matters, and 
that the formulation of a standard significantly impacts the outcome of 
case. 
This Part further challenges the belief that there are only two civil 
standards of proof.  It argues that immigration law’s “clear, unequivocal, 
and convincing” standard signifies a third civil standard of proof.  Because 
the Supreme Court’s original formulation and explanation of a standard 
illuminates the intended stringency of a standard, this Part traces the 
evolution of the “clear, unequivocal, and convincing” standard from its 
original to current formulations.  This Part then analyzes the two circuit 
court opinions analyzing whether this standard is different than the 
intermediate, “clear and convincing” standard of proof.  And because the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) codifies both the “clear and 
convincing” and “clear, unequivocal, and convincing” formulations,63 this 
                                                          
 60.   Schwartz & Seaman, supra note 17, at 459–69 (testing jury instruction given in Microsoft 
Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership, 564 U.S. 91 (2011)). 
 61.   Id. at 459–60. 
 62.   Id. at 469; see also United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 411 (1978) (analyzing results 
of surveyed circuit court judges’ view of four standards of proof); Underwood, supra note 37, at 1309 
(observing that previous studies suggest that explanations of a standard can affect the outcome of a 
case). 
 63.   8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(b)(5)(A), (c)(3)(A) (2012). 
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Part concludes with analysis on how canons of statutory interpretation 
resolve the question of whether these are different standards of proof. 
A. Origins of the Standard 
What is now the “clear, unequivocal, and convincing” standard 
familiar to immigration law originated in a series of U.S. Supreme Court 
denaturalization cases in the 1940s.64  In those cases, the Court 
consistently described this standard as the civil equivalent of criminal 
law’s reasonable doubt standard.65  The Court has never described the 
“clear and convincing” standard in this manner, which strongly indicates 
the Court intended for immigration law’s “clear, unequivocal, and 
convincing” standard to signify a standard higher than that required of the 
“clear and convincing” standard.66 
As background, the denaturalization cases that established this 
standard occurred in the post-World War I to World War II era, a time 
when Americans viewed foreignness, immigrants, and viewpoints running 
contrary to the status quo more harshly than usual; even Jewish refugees 
fleeing Nazi Germany were unwelcome.67  This animosity manifested into 
political pressure that led the government to initiate denaturalization 
proceedings against countless naturalized citizens who held “unfavorable” 
political views.68  This included William Schneiderman, a Russian-born, 
naturalized U.S. citizen who avidly supported Nazism and Communism.69  
As it had in other denaturalization proceedings, the government claimed 
                                                          
 64.   See, e.g., Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601 (1949); Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 
654 (1946); Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665 (1944); Schneiderman v. United States, 320 
U.S. 118 (1943). 
 65.   Id. 
 66.   See, e.g., Mondaca-Vega v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 413, 431 (9th Cir. 2015) (Smith, J., dissenting), 
cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 36 (2016). 
 67.   David Fontana, Note, A Case for the Twenty-First Century Constitutional Canon: 
Schneiderman v. United States, 35 CONN. L. REV. 35, 42–43 (2002) (observing that the war in Europe 
in the late 1930s and early 1940s created political pressure in the United States to stamp out disloyalty 
derived from Communist and pro-Nazi sympathy in the United States and arguing that this pressure 
manifested into a denaturalization litigation strategy that included Schneiderman’s denaturalization 
proceedings); Here’s Fortune’s Survey on How Americans Viewed Jewish Refugees in 1938, FORTUNE 
(Nov. 18, 2015), http://fortune.com/2015/11/18/fortune-survey-jewish-refugees/#jewish-refugees 
(citing survey results from 1938 in which 67.4% of Americans stated “we should try to keep [Jewish 
refugees] out”). 
 68.   Fontana, supra note 67, at 42–43; see also Schneiderman, 320 U.S. at 125. 
 69.   See Fontana, supra note 67, at 35 (“[I]n 1939, the United States attempted to revoke 
Schneiderman’s citizenship most likely to strike a blow against [his] possible disloyalty, especially 
[his] pro-Communist or pro-Nazi behavior at a time when the Soviet Union was fighting against 
American interests in World War II.”). 
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Mr. Schneiderman’s controversial political views rendered him “disloyal” 
and therefore he had fraudulently or illegally procured his naturalization 
decree.70 
Because immigration statutes did not address what the government’s 
standard of proof was in denaturalization proceedings, the judiciary 
resolved this question.71  Lower courts required the government prove 
fraudulent procurement by a preponderance.72  In Schneiderman v. United 
States, however, the Supreme Court reversed, finding the preponderance 
standard was too low given the “precious right of citizenship” that is at 
stake in denaturalization proceedings.73  Also driving the Court’s decision 
was its concern that through these denaturalization proceedings, 
naturalized citizens were being denied their First Amendment right to 
freedom of thought, which the natural-born citizenry freely enjoyed.74  The 
Court further reasoned that in other fraudulent procurement cases, the 
government’s burden was higher than “a bare preponderance of evidence 
which leaves the issue in doubt.”75  Consequently, Justice Murphy, writing 
for the majority, announced that in denaturalization proceedings, the 
government must meet a “heavy” and “exacting” burden by providing 
“‘clear, unequivocal, and convincing’ evidence which does not leave the 
issue in doubt.”76 
Two subsequent Supreme Court cases further illuminate the degree of 
belief the Schneiderman standard of proof requires.  First, in Knauer v. 
United States, the Court described the government’s standard in 
denaturalization proceedings as requiring evidence “beyond a reasonable 
doubt”—the standard used in criminal proceedings.77  Specifically, the 
Court noted that in the underlying denaturalization proceedings, the lower 
courts found the government proved “beyond a reasonable doubt” that Mr. 
Knauer fraudulently procured his denaturalization decree.78  The Supreme 
                                                          
 70.   Schneiderman, 320 U.S. at 121–22; Developments in the Law: Immigration and Nationality, 
66 HARV. L. REV. 643, 722 (1953). 
 71.   See Schneiderman, 320 U.S. at 125. 
 72.   Id. at 122. 
 73.   Id. at 122, 161. 
 74.   Id. at 137. 
 75.   Id. at 125. 
 76.   Id. at 135.  Though in passing and over the course of an eighty-eight-page Majority Opinion, 
the Court also referred to the standard as “clear, unequivocal, and convincing” and as evidence of 
“clear and convincing character.” Id. at 123.  Similarly, the concurring and dissenting opinions 
mentioned the standard as requiring evidence that is “clear, unequivocal and convincing,” “clear and 
convincing,” “clear, not speculative,” and “clear beyond all reasonable doubt.” Id. at 161 (Douglas, J., 
concurring); Id. at 178, 181 (Stone, C.J., dissenting). 
 77.   Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654, 657 (1946). 
 78.   Id. at 656. 
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Court then stated that the standard of proof required to denaturalize a 
citizen is “‘clear, unequivocal, and convincing’ evidence, which does not 
leave ‘the issue in doubt.’”79  And after evaluating the evidence, the Court 
held “the two lower courts were correct in their conclusions.  The standard 
of proof, not satisfied in either the Schneiderman or Baumgartner cases, 
is therefore plainly met here.”80 
Notably, the Court did not state that the reasonable doubt standard was 
a higher standard than Schneiderman required.81  To the contrary, a five-
sentence concurring opinion in Knauer cites the reasonable doubt 
standard—twice.82  And the dissenting Justices—one of whom was Justice 
Murphy, the author of the Schneiderman majority opinion—remained 
silent regarding the Knauer majority’s analysis of the Schneiderman 
standard, dissenting on other grounds.83 
In a second case, Klapprott v. United States, decided just six years 
after Schneiderman, the Court issued a plurality opinion that again 
described the Schneiderman standard as requiring evidence beyond a 
reasonable doubt.84  The issue in Klapprott was whether a naturalized 
citizen could be denaturalized through a default judgment.85  The Court 
held it could not—not only  “because of the grave consequences incident 
to denaturalization proceedings,” but also because the government must 
prove its case “by clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence which does 
not leave the issue in doubt,” a burden not satisfied by the defendant 
simply defaulting.86  Importantly, the Court further explained, “[t]his 
burden is substantially identical with that required in criminal cases—
proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”87 
Similarly, in a separate concurrence, which Justice Murphy joined, 
Justice Rutledge observed that “the Schneiderman decision . . . required a 
burden of proof for denaturalization which in effect approximates the 
burden demanded for conviction in criminal cases, namely, proof beyond 
a reasonable doubt of the charges alleged as cause for denaturalization.”88  
                                                          
 79.   Id. at 657–58. 
 80.   Id. at 660. 
 81.   See id.  Indeed, had the Knauer Court considered the lower courts’ reasonable doubt 
standard higher than what Schneiderman required, it seems one of the Justices would have noted as 
much, such as by observing that the use of the reasonable doubt standard was a harmless error. 
 82.   Id. at 674–75 (Black, J., concurring). 
 83.   Id. at 675–79. 
 84.   Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 612–13 (1949) (plurality opinion). 
 85.   Id. at 602. 
 86.   Id. at 612 (citing Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 158 (1943)). 
 87.   Id. (emphasis added). 
 88.   Id. at 617. 
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And “in view of the substantial kinship of the proceedings with criminal 
causes,” “no less [proof] should be required” in denaturalization, 
regardless of its technical form or label.89 
Notably, no Justice, including the dissenting Justices—two of whom 
were members of the Schneiderman bench—objected to their brethren’s 
description of the Schneiderman standard as requiring proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt.90  Thus, although Klapprott was a plurality opinion, the 
powerful descriptions of the Schneiderman standard used by long-time 
members of the bench—without objection by other members or even the 
parties—further show that the Court consistently described the standard 
not as the “clear and convincing” intermediate standard, but as civil 
counterpart to the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.91 
As further evidence of the stringency of the Schneiderman standard, it 
should be noted that Schneiderman and its progeny largely ended 
disloyalty denaturalization litigation in the 1940s.92  Also indicative of the 
                                                          
 89.   Id. at 618 (citation omitted). 
 90.   See id. at 620–31. 
 91.   Id.Similarly, the government raised no objections to the lower court’s requirement that the 
government “establish its contentions affirmatively by evidence clear, convincing and unequivocal— 
to all practical intents and purposes beyond a reasonable doubt.”  See Brief of Paul Knauer, Petitioner 
at 8, Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654 (1946) (No. 510), 1946 WL 50569, at *10 (quoting Trial 
Court’s Memorandum); see also Brief for the United States, Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654 
(1946) (No. 510), 1946 WL 50570.  Nor did the government argue that if the Court found that contrary 
to the lower courts’ findings that the beyond a reasonable doubt burden had not been met, the Court 
should remand for the lower court’s correct evaluation of the evidence under the correct legal standard, 
i.e., the “lower” clear, unequivocal, and convincing standard.  See Brief for the United States, 1946 
WL 50570.  The Government also did not rebuff Knauer’s assertion that “[i]n the Schneiderman 
case, . . . this Court changed the civil evidence rule in denaturalization cases from probability to clear, 
convincing and unequivocal evidence that leaves no doubt . . . .”  Brief of Paul Knauer, 1946 WL 
50569, at *42.  The government did, however, argue repeatedly that the evidence established “beyond 
a troubling doubt” that Knauer should be denaturalized.  See Brief for the United States, 1946 WL 
50570 at *26, 30, 37. 
 92.   Though the Court effectively ended disloyalty denaturalization litigation, this was not 
without pushback from Congress.  See Developments in the Law Immigration and Nationality, supra 
note 70, at 723; see also Fontana, supra note 67, at 68 (“Schneiderman prevented the potential 
denaturalization of hundreds of thousands of Americans.”).  For example, in 1950, Congress enacted 
the Internal Security Act (“ISA”) in an attempt to circumvent these precedents with a burden-shifting 
framework.  Developments in the Law Immigration and Nationality, supra note 70, at 723.  The ISA 
provided that if, within five years of naturalization, a naturalized citizen affiliated with an organization 
whose prior association would have prevented his naturalization, a presumption would arise that the 
naturalized citizen had not attached to the principles of the Constitution and therefore obtained his 
naturalization decree by fraud.  Id.  The burden would then shift to the naturalized citizen; if he did 
not rebut this presumption, the government’s prima facie evidence would establish fraudulent or illegal 
procurement of a naturalization decree.  Id.  This burden-shifting framework was incorporated into the 
Nationality Act of 1952 and still exists in the current INA.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1481(b) (2012); Charles H. 
Hooker, Comment, The Past as a Prologue: Schneiderman v. United States and Contemporary 
Questions of Citizenship and Denationalization, 19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 305, 340 (2005).  Since its 
enactment, however, scholars have seriously questioned the constitutionality of this provision, which 
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stringency of the Schneiderman standard is the fact that the Court affirmed 
only one lower court’s denaturalization finding amid the politically 
charged state of the United States during the World War II era.93 
B. The Standard’s Modern Formulation 
During the era of denaturalization litigation of the 1940s and 1950s, 
the Supreme Court consistently held that the Schneiderman standard 
required “clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence which does not 
leave the issue in doubt.”94  The Court also consistently explained that this 
standard of proof was akin to the reasonable doubt standard.95 
But that trend shifted, beginning with Woodby v. INS, when the Court 
adopted an abbreviated formulation of the Schneiderman standard for 
deportation proceedings.96  As background, in Woodby, the lower courts 
required the government provide “reasonable, substantial, and probative 
evidence” of a noncitizen’s deportability.97  These courts had derived this 
standard from two provisions of the INA: first, section 106(a)(4), which 
stated that a deportation order shall be conclusive “if supported by 
reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered 
as a whole,” and second, section 242(b)(4), which stated that “no decision 
of deportability shall be valid unless it is based upon reasonable, 
substantial, and probative evidence.”98 
The Woodby court, however, found these statutory provisions 
addressed the judicial standard of review, not the government’s standard 
of proof in deportation proceedings.99  In deciding which standard the 
government should meet, the Court rejected the reasonable doubt standard, 
                                                          
has never been tested, as it has never been the sole ground upon which the government sought to 
denaturalize a citizen.  Id. at 341–43. 
 93.   Decided less than two years after Schneiderman, Knauer was the only time that the Court 
affirmed the lower court’s decision to denaturalize a citizen in the 1940s.  Knauer, 328 U.S. at 660. 
 94.   See supra note 64. 
 95.   Id. 
 96.   See Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285 (1966).  In the 1950s, the Supreme Court held that 
the Schneiderman evidentiary standard also applied in statutory expatriation cases.  Perez v. Brownell, 
356 U.S. 44, 47 n.2 (1958) (citing Gonzales v. Landon, 350 U.S. 920 (1955) and Schneiderman v. 
United States, 320 U.S. 118, 158 (1943)).  In 1967, however, the Supreme Court overruled these 
precedents and held that Congress has no power to rob a citizen of his citizenship through involuntary 
expatriation.  Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 267–68 (1967).  Because the expatriation cases do not 
illuminate the Schneiderman standard’s location on the continuum of proof, these cases are not further 
discussed. 
 97.   Woodby, 385 U.S. at 277–82. 
 98.   See id. at 279–82. 
 99.   Id. at 282. 
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reasoning that deportation proceedings are neither criminal nor punitive.100  
The Court then reasoned that because “[t]he immediate hardship of 
deportation is often greater than that inflicted by denaturalization,” “[n]o 
less a burden of proof is appropriate in deportation proceedings.”101  
Consequently, the Court held that government must meet Schneiderman’s 
requirement of “clear, unequivocal, and convincing” evidence in 
deportation proceedings.102 
Although the Court explicitly cited Schneiderman and adopted its 
standard, the Court did not include Schneiderman’s dependent clause, that 
the evidence should “not leave the issue in doubt,” nor did the Court 
describe it as being akin to the reasonable doubt standard, as it previous 
had in the denaturalization context.103  Still, it did note that the “clear, 
unequivocal, and convincing” standard—or “an even higher” standard—
was “no stranger” to civil law.104  Thus, the Court in Woodby clearly 
observed that there is a higher civil standard of proof than the intermediate, 
“clear and convincing” standard. 
Following this decision, lower courts applied and federal regulations 
incorporated Woodby’s abbreviated version of the Schneiderman standard, 
requiring the government prove deportability with the “clear, unequivocal, 
and convincing” evidence, rather than the longer formulation articulated 
in Schneiderman.105  But as discussed below, the Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) not only 
changed the applicability of this standard, it also codified several new 
standards of proof and modified key terminology. 
Turning first to terminology, prior to IIRIRA, the INA provided for 
“exclusion” and “deportation” proceedings.106  The type of proceeding 
depended on where the noncitizen was apprehended.107  If a noncitizen 
were apprehended at the port of entry, he would be placed in “exclusion” 
proceedings for being “inadmissible.”108  But if a noncitizen were 
                                                          
 100.   Id. at 284–85. 
 101.   Id. at 286. 
 102.   Id. 
 103.   See id; see also Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 165 (1943). 
 104.   Woodby, 385 U.S. at 285 n.18. 
 105.   See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 242.14(a) (1997) (adopting the Woodby standard). 
 106.   Ward v. Holder, 733 F.3d 601, 603–04 (6th Cir. 2013) (providing background on changes 
IIRIRA made to “rather confusing terminology” in the INA). 
 107.   Id. at 603. 
 108.   Id. 
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apprehended inside the U.S. interior, he would be placed in “deportation” 
proceedings for either being “deportable” or “inadmissible.”109 
IIRIRA, however, combined “exclusion” and “deportation” 
proceedings into “removal” proceedings, yet it retained the two grounds 
for removability.110  Thus, today, a noncitizen is removable for being 
“deportable”—that is, he was previously admitted into the United States, 
but is now “deportable” under INA § 237(a) for being in violation of the 
law—or “inadmissible”—that is, he either entered the United States 
without being admitted or sought to enter the United States without proper 
travel documents and is therefore “inadmissible” under section 212(a).111 
IIRIRA also made the following four changes to the standards of proof 
in the INA: 
First, Congress now requires “clear and convincing” evidence of a 
noncitizen’s deportability.112  This essentially cabined Woodby’s 
applicability to noncitizens charged with deportability.113  Hence, where 
federal regulation incorporated the Woodby standard pre-1997, the 
regulation now requires the IIRIRA “clear and convincing” standard in 
establishing deportability.114 
Second, in absentia removal proceedings (in which the noncitizen does 
not appear at his final removal hearing), Congress requires the government 
to provide “clear, unequivocal, and convincing” evidence that written 
notice of the removal hearing was provided and that the noncitizen is 
removable.115  Thus, in absentia proceedings, Congress codified the 
Woodby standard for proceedings in which a noncitizen is absent, 
regardless of whether that noncitizen is charged with being removable due 
to inadmissibly or deportability. 
Third, noncitizens in removal proceedings must prove their 
admissibility “clearly and beyond doubt.”116  And fourth, Congress 
requires the government to satisfy the preponderance standard in several 
                                                          
 109.   Id. 
 110.   Id. at 604. 
 111.   8 U.S.C. § 1229a(a)(1)–(2) (2012). 
 112.   8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(a) (2017) (same). 
 113.   Ward, 733 F.3d at 604. 
 114.   Compare 8 C.F.R. § 1240.46(a) (2017) (applying to proceedings commenced before IIRIRA 
went into effect, requiring “clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the facts alleged as 
grounds for deportation are true”) with 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(a) (applying to proceedings commenced 
after IIRIRA went into effect, requiring “clear and convincing evidence that the respondent is 
deportable as charged”). 
 115.   8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(A). 
 116.   8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(b)–(c) (same). 
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other sections of the INA.117  Thus, the INA contemplates four standards 
of proof for immigration proceedings. 
Currently, neither the INA nor agency regulations address all 
applicable standards of proof in removal proceedings.  For example, 
although case law and agency regulations require the government to prove 
the alienage of an allegedly inadmissible noncitizen, there is no statute or 
regulation that specifies the government’s requisite standard of proof.118  
To fill this gap, courts apply the Woodby standard, requiring the 
government to provide “clear, unequivocal, and convincing” evidence of 
alienage.119 
Recently, two circuit courts were presented the question of whether 
the Woodby standard is simply another formulation for the intermediate, 
“clear and convincing” standard, or whether it is an “even higher” 
standard.  Those decisions are analyzed below. 
C. The Circuit Split 
This section explores two circuit courts’ analysis of whether “clear 
and convincing” evidence is a different standard than Woodby’s “clear, 
unequivocal, and convincing” evidence.  Several considerations stemming 
from the prior sections’ history of the standard will guide this analysis. 
First, what is the most accurate way for courts to frame this legal 
issue?  Both the Sixth and Ninth Circuits framed it as a question of whether 
the omission of “unequivocal” from the Woodby version of the 
Schneiderman standard creates a standard different than the intermediate, 
“clear and convincing” standard.120  But Woodby clearly adopted 
Schneiderman, and also noted that deportation creates an even greater 
hardship than denaturalization.  Thus, the more precise way to frame this 
issue would be to compare the entire Schneiderman standard—”“clear, 
unequivocal, and convincing evidence that does not leave the issue in 
                                                          
 117.   See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. §§ 1186a(b)(2), (c)(3)(D) (2012); 8 U.S.C. § 1186b(b)(2) (2012); see also 
8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(d) (same). 
 118.   Agency regulations state only that in removal proceedings, the government must first prove 
the alienage of the noncitizen.  8 C.F.R. § 1240.8(c) (2017) (“In the case of a respondent charged as 
being in the United States without being admitted or paroled, the Service must first establish the 
alienage of the respondent.”). 
 119.   See, e.g., Gupta v. Lynch, 661 Fed. Appx. 737, 739 (2d Cir. 2016); Murphy v. INS, 54 F.3d 
605, 608 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 281, 284–85 (1966)); Sint v. INS, 500 
F.2d 120, 123 (1st Cir. 1974); Daniel Kanstroom, Hello Darkness: Involuntary Testimony and Silence 
as Evidence in Deportation Proceedings, 4 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 599, 629 (1991) (observing that “since 
Woodby was decided [in 1967], the BIA and the courts have often evaluated evidence of alienage 
presented by the [government] to determine if it meets the Woodby standard”). 
 120.   See Mondaca-Vega v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 413, 420 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 36 
(2016); Ward v. Holder, 733 F.3d 601, 605–06 (6th Cir. 2013). 
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doubt”—with the “clear and convincing” standard.  This would ensure that 
courts consider the context in which the Court has employed the “clear, 
unequivocal, and convincing” standard—to protect a supremely precious 
right: the right of citizenship and presence in this country; the right to have 
constitutional rights—an essential function of a standard of proof.  But by 
comparing the truncated Woodby standard, one necessarily ignores the 
important societal concerns considered in Schneiderman and Woodby.  
This greatly dilutes the important role standards of proof are meant to play 
in our legal system. 
Second, even if courts ignore Schneiderman’s dependent clause that 
explains what “unequivocal” means, does the addition of the word 
“unequivocal” to the formulation make a difference to the stringency of 
the standard?  And finally, given that Congress codified both the “clear 
and convincing” and “clear, unequivocal, and convincing” formulations in 
the INA, how do canons of statutory interpretation direct courts to resolve 
whether these standards are satisfied by different degrees of belief?  These 
considerations are explored below. 
1. Ward v. Holder 
The question of where on the continuum of proof the “clear, 
unequivocal, and convincing” standard lays was first addressed in Ward v. 
Holder, a Sixth Circuit case from 2013.121  There, a lawful permanent 
resident left the United States for three years to care for his ailing mother 
in the United Kingdom.122  When he returned to the United States, he 
presented his green card, which had expired, and as a result, immigration 
officials placed him in removal proceedings on inadmissibility grounds 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a).123  The immigration court found that under 8 
U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3), the government was required to provide “clear and 
convincing” evidence that Ward had abandoned his lawful permanent 
resident status and was therefore inadmissible.124 
The Sixth Circuit, however, found that the immigration judge’s 
reliance on section 1229a(c)(3)’s “clear and convincing” standard was 
incorrect because that section applies to proving a noncitizen is 
“deportable,” not “inadmissible,” as Ward was charged with.125  Instead, 
                                                          
 121.   Ward, 733 F.3d at 602. 
 122.   Id. at 603. 
 123.   Id. 
 124.   Id. at 604. 
 125.   Id. at 606–07. 
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the court found the correct evidentiary standard for proving inadmissibility 
due to abandonment of lawful permanent residence status is “clear, 
unequivocal, and convincing,” as established by Sixth Circuit 
precedent.126 
The court then analyzed whether the immigration judge’s omission of 
the word “unequivocal” from its standard formulation was an error.127  The 
court found that it was, based on Addington v. Texas.128  There, the 
Supreme Court considered what degree of proof is required to satisfy due 
process “in a civil proceeding . . . to commit an individual involuntarily 
for an indefinite period to a state mental hospital.”129  The trial court had 
applied the “clear, unequivocal, and convincing” standard, the court of 
appeals had applied the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard, and the 
Texas Supreme Court had applied the “preponderance of the evidence” 
standard.130 
The Supreme Court held that “clear and convincing” evidence 
satisfied due process.131  But because the trial court had required “clear, 
unequivocal, and convincing” evidence, the Court remanded to the Texas 
Supreme Court and directed it to decide whether Texas law requires a 
“burden equal to or greater than the ‘clear and convincing’ standard” 
required to satisfy due process.132 
Based on Addington, Ward found that the omission of “unequivocal” 
from the standard formulation does makes a difference, and consequently 
held that “[t]he ‘clear, unequivocal, and convincing standard’ is a more 
demanding degree of proof than the ‘clear and convincing’ standard.”133  
Notably, this is the same conclusion the BIA reached, albeit without 
analysis, in Matter of Patel in 1988.134 
                                                          
 126.   Id. at 607 (“The Immigration Judge could not have relied upon another section of the Act, 
because the Act nowhere specifies the standard of proof in cases in which the government has alleged 
that a lawful permanent resident is inadmissible because he or she has abandoned his or her lawful 
permanent resident status. Instead, the applicable degree of proof—’’’to establish by clear, 
unequivocal, and convincing evidence’ that Ward’s status had changed—comes from case law; in our 
Circuit.” (citing Hana v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 472, 475–76 (6th Cir. 2005) and Woodby v. INS, 385 
U.S. 267, 277 (1966)”). 
 127.   Id. at 605. 
 128.   Id. (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 419–20 (1979)). 
 129.   Addington, 441 U.S. at 419–20. 
 130.   State v. Addington, 588 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex. 1979). 
 131.   Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. at 433. 
 132.   Id. 
 133.   Ward, 733 F.3d at 605–06. 
 134.   Matter of Patel, 19 I & N Dec. 774, 783 (BIA 1988) (finding without analyzing that under 
Addington, “the clear and convincing standard imposes a lower burden than the clear, unequivocal, 
and convincing standard . . . because it does not require that the evidence be unequivocal or of such a 
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2. Mondaca-Vega v. Lynch 
Shortly after Ward was decided, the en banc Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals addressed whether immigration law’s “clear, unequivocal, and 
convincing” standard is the same as “clear and convincing” in Mondaca-
Vega v. Lynch in 2015.135  There, the government had placed Reynaldo 
Mondaca in removal proceedings on inadmissibility grounds.136  Mondaca, 
however, claimed to be a U.S. citizen by birth, which the government had 
repeatedly confirmed prior to initiating his removal proceedings; for 
example, it had issued him a U.S. passport, twice, and recognized his 
foreign-born children as U.S. citizens based on his status as a U.S. 
citizen.137  In his removal proceedings, however, the government claimed 
Mondaca was actually Salvador Mondaca-Vega, a Mexican citizen.138 
The flashpoint issue in the case, therefore, was whether the 
government had established Mondaca-Vega’s alienage.139  Ninth Circuit 
case law has established that the government must prove “alienage”—an 
element of “inadmissibility” and an immigration judge’s basis for 
jurisdiction140—with “clear, unequivocal, and convincing” evidence.141  
However, the lower court in Mondaca-Vega required only “clear and 
convincing” evidence of alienage.142 
Thus, like Ward, a key issue in Mondaca-Vega was whether the lower 
court had applied the correct standard.143  And also like Ward, Mondaca-
Vega framed the issue as whether the lower court’s omission of 
                                                          
quality as to dispel all doubt”). 
 135.   Mondaca-Vega v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 413, 420 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 36 
(2016). 
 136.   Id. at 418. 
 137.   Id. 
 138.   Id. at 424 (“The question for the district court was straightforward: Who is the petitioner?  
Is he Reynaldo Mondaca Carlon, a native and citizen of the United States, or Salvador Mondaca–
Vega, a native and citizen of Mexico?”). 
 139.   Id. at 419–20 (“At issue, then, is whether the government bore its burden of proving the 
petitioner’s alienage.”). 
 140.   See United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S. 149, 153 (1923) (“[A]lienage is a 
jurisdictional fact; . . . an order of deportation must be predicated upon a finding of that fact.”), 
overruled on other grounds by INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032 (1984); Matter of Guevara, 20 
I & N Dec. 238, 242 (BIA 1990, 1991) (“[T]he burden of proof in deportation proceedings is upon the 
Service to establish the alienage of the respondent, and ultimately his deportability, by evidence that 
is clear, unequivocal, and convincing.”). 
 141.   Mondaca-Vega, 808 F.3d at 419. 
 142.   Id. 
 143.   Id. (“The threshold issue is whether the [lower] court erred in holding the government to a 
‘clear and convincing’ burden of proof.”). 
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“unequivocal” from the standard was an error.144  But unlike Ward, the 
Mondaca-Vega court concluded the two lower courts had not erred, 
finding the “clear and convincing” standard requires the same degree of 
belief as the “clear, unequivocal, and convincing” standard.145 
The court cited several reasons for this conclusion; however, the 
theme underlying each reason is the court’s belief that there are only three 
standards of proof, and therefore the most stringent standard of proof in 
civil law is “clear and convincing.”146  For example, the court found it 
“implausible” that “clear, unequivocal, and convincing” could signify a 
fourth burden of proof—”something between clear and convincing 
evidence and proof beyond a reasonable doubt”—because the Supreme 
Court has “repeatedly emphasized that there are three burdens of proof . . 
. .”147 
But as previously noted, and as a dissenting judge in Mondaca-Vega 
observed, the Supreme Court “has never suggested that standards of proof 
are limited to these three general levels.”148  Rather, the Supreme Court 
has repeatedly recognized a continuum of proof, in addition to 
acknowledging that a spectrum exists even within the intermediate 
standard.149  Indeed, in Woodby, the Court observed that Schneiderman’s 
“clear, unequivocal, and convincing” standard—or an “even higher 
one”—is no stranger to civil law.150  This alone directly conflicts with 
Mondaca-Vega’s finding that the Supreme Court has found there are only 
three standards of proof. 
Mondaca-Vega also conflicts with Addington.  There, as previously 
noted, the Supreme Court held that the “clear and convincing” evidence 
was the standard required to satisfy due process in involuntary 
commitment proceedings.151  And because the trial court had required 
“clear, unequivocal, and convincing” evidence, the Court remanded to the 
Texas Supreme Court and directed it to decide whether Texas law requires 
a “burden equal to or greater than the ‘clear and convincing’ standard” 
                                                          
 144.   Id. 
 145.   Id. at 422. 
 146.   Id. (“[T]here are three burdens of proof . . . .  Three is enough.” (citations omitted)). 
 147.   Id. at 421–22 (citations omitted). 
 148.   Id. at 429 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
 149.   See, e.g., Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979); Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285 
n.18 (1966). 
 150.   Woodby, 385 U.S. at 285 n.18; see also California ex rel. Cooper v. Mitchell Bros.’ Santa 
Ana Theater, 454 U.S. 90, 93 (1981) (per curiam) (“This Court has, on several occasions, held that the 
‘clear and convincing’ standard or one of its variants is the appropriate standard of proof in a particular 
civil case.”). 
 151.   Addington, 441 U.S. at 419–20, 433. 
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required to satisfy due process.152  Thus, if there were only three standards 
of proof as Mondaca-Vega found, the Court in Addington would have had 
no reason to leave it to the Texas Supreme Court to determine whether to 
adopt the “clear, unequivocal, and convincing” standard applied by the 
trial court—the two would have been formulations of the same standard.  
But Addington remanded.153  And on remand, the Texas Supreme Court 
adopted the “clear and convincing” standard of proof, and held that 
because the trial court had employed the “stricter” “clear, unequivocal, and 
convincing” standard, the trial judge’s error was harmless.154 
Moreover, in concluding that there are only three standards, the court 
in Mondaca-Vega also found that “it defies reason to think that a fourth 
burden of proof could be meaningfully distinguished and distinctly 
applied.”155  But as previously noted, empirical research shows otherwise; 
indeed, research consistently shows that judges can and do distinguish 
between more than three standards of proof.156  And even if judges could 
not, the Supreme Court has repeatedly explained that “clear, unequivocal, 
and convincing” evidence is akin to the reasonable doubt standard; 
therefore, immigration judges would be applying a well-established 
standard, albeit in the civil context,157 not a “nebulous” standard that 
requires the “hair-splitting” the Mondaca-Vega court expressed concern 
with.158 
To that point, however, the court rejected that the “clear, unequivocal, 
and convincing” standard could be interpreted as meaning “beyond a 
reasonable doubt,” because “[t]he Supreme Court surely knows how to use 
the phrase ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ when it wants to[,but i]n the 
                                                          
 152.   Id. at 433. 
 153.   Id. 
 154.   State v. Addington, 588 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex. 1979). 
 155.   Mondaca-Vega v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 413, 422 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 36 
(2016). 
 156.   See, e.g., United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 411 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) (analyzing results 
of surveyed circuit court judges’ view of four standards of proof). 
 157.   In a parenthetical, the court found the reasonable doubt standard could not apply in 
immigration court, reasoning that “the Court has never required the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ 
standard to be applied in a civil case.  This unique standard of proof . . . is regarded as a critical part 
of the moral force of the criminal law.”  Mondaca-Vega, 808 F.3d at 421 (quoting California ex rel. 
Cooper v. Mitchell Bros.’ Santa Ana Theater, 454 U.S. 90, 93 (1981) (per curiam)).  However, as 
noted in Part I, this statement was inaccurate when the Supreme Court issued that decision in 1981—
In re Winship applied the reasonable doubt standard to a civil matter in 1970—and it remains 
inaccurate today.  See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 258, 368 (1970) (holding the reasonable doubt standard 
is required in civil juvenile delinquency proceedings); see also Cloud, supra note 40, at 125 (observing 
that numerous states apply the reasonable doubt standard in deciding civil commitment cases). 
 158.   See Mondaca-Vega, 808 F.3d at 422. 
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citizenship context . . . it has never done so.”159  And the court is right; no 
Supreme Court case has ever stated that the standard for establishing 
alienage is “beyond a reasonable doubt.”  But to be sure, a nearly half-
century long line of Supreme Court cases have consistently described the 
Schneiderman standard as being the “[civil] equivalent to that enforced in 
criminal cases,” that is, it is “substantially identical with that required in 
criminal cases—proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”160  Indeed, in Knauer, 
the Court affirmed the lower court’s application of the reasonable doubt 
standard, clearly equating it to the “clear, unequivocal, and convincing” 
standard, which the concurring opinion also referred to as requiring proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt.161 
The Mondaca-Vega court did not address these precedents, perhaps 
because some are plurality opinions.162  However, these plurality opinions 
are still highly persuasive here given their temporal proximity to 
Schneiderman; indeed, members of the Schneiderman bench were the 
plurality’s authors.  And Knauer was a majority opinion.  Thus, it is not 
possible to reconcile Knauer with Mondaca-Vega’s finding that the only 
way a court could require proof beyond a reasonable doubt is by 
articulating the “beyond a reasonable doubt” formulation. 
Finally, Mondaca-Vega compared the Supreme Court’s formulation 
of the “clear, unequivocal, and convincing” standard and concluded that 
the Court used it interchangeably with the “clear and convincing” 
standard.163  As an example of this, the court noted that Baumgartner—a 
denaturalization case issued less than a year after Schneiderman—required 
“clear, unequivocal, and convincing” evidence, and Pullman-Standard v. 
Swint, described Baumgartner as deciding “whether or not the findings of 
the two lower courts satisfied the clear and convincing standard of proof 
necessary to sustain a denaturalization decree.”164  Consequently, the 
Mondaca-Vega court decided against “mechanistically conclud[ing] that 
the phrase [“clear, unequivocal, and convincing”] signifies a burden of 
proof higher than the familiar intermediate standard simply because it 
contains the additional word ‘unequivocal.’”165 
                                                          
 159.   Id. at 421. 
 160.   See, e.g., Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 792 (1988); Klapprott v. United States, 
335 U.S. 601, 612 (1949). 
 161.   Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654, 660 (1946). 
 162.   See Mondaca-Vega, 808 F.3d at 422. 
 163.   Id. at 420. 
 164.   Id. (emphasis added). 
 165.   Id. 
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The court’s analysis on this point is misguided for three reasons.  First, 
in its usage comparison, the court did not include the dependent clause that 
the Court consistently used to explain the meaning of equivocal—proof 
“that leaves no troubling doubt”—in its analysis.166  As noted in Part II, 
scholars have long observed that the Court’s use of explanatory phrases is 
key to understanding the standard’s intended stringency, and only after 
that stringency is well-developed in case law and understood by 
factfinders are those dependent clauses no longer necessary.167  Here, 
however, the dependent clause remains necessary to determining what 
stringency the Court intended for this standard to demand.  Thus, the 
court’s starting point—comparing the truncated formulation of the 
standard with the “clear and convincing” standard—takes its analysis off 
course. 
Second, as proof that the Court uses the standards interchangeably, 
Mondaca-Vega cites Pullman-Standard’s footnote reference to 
Baumgartner.168  Pullman-Standard was a Title VII case from the 1980s, 
while Baumgartner was a denaturalization case from 1945.169  The issue 
in both cases was whether the Court could review the lower court’s factual 
findings; the standard of proof was not at issue in Pullman-Standard.170  
Hence, Pullman-Standard referenced Baumgartner’s standard of proof 
only to explain why Baumgartner established that certain factual findings 
are subject to appellate de novo review, one being that the significance of 
the exacting Schneiderman standard of proof would be lost if the whole 
record were deemed a fact not subject to appellate review.171  Given that 
the standard of proof was not at issue, the Pullman-Standard statement 
that Baumgartner required “clear-and-convincing” evidence is owed little 
weight, or as one judge observed, “[the Pullman-Standard Court’s 
i]mprecise usage . . . is not a proper basis for concluding that words have 
no meaning, especially in light of the Supreme Court’s clear and 
unambiguous directive regarding the burden of proof.”172 
This leads to the Mondaca-Vega court’s third error, which is that the 
court did not address the numerous Supreme Court cases that directly 
                                                          
 166.   See id. 
 167.   McBaine, supra note 57, at 256. 
 168.   Id. 
 169.   Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 275 (1982); Baumgartner v. United States, 322 
U.S. 665, 666 (1944). 
 170.   Pullman-Standard, 456 U.S. at 285–86, 288. 
 171.   Id. at 286 n.16. 
 172.   Mondaca-Vega v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 413, 432 (9th Cir. 2015) (Smith, J. dissenting), cert. 
denied, 137 S. Ct. 36 (2016). 
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analyze and apply the meaning of the “clear, unequivocal, and convincing” 
standard of proof.173  This includes Addington—which held the “clear and 
convincing” standard was the appropriate standard in involuntary 
commitment cases not “clear, unequivocal, and convincing”—and 
Knauer—an immigration case that explicitly held that the “reasonable 
doubt” standard satisfied the “clear, unequivocal, and convincing” 
standard.174 
Ultimately, Mondaca-Vega’s reasoning suggests that the Court’s use 
of an imprecise formulation of the standard in one non-immigration case 
is owed more weight than the Court’s precise and consistent formulation 
of the standard in numerous other immigration cases.  But this logic 
necessarily ignores one of the key functions a standard serves—to signal 
to the factfinder the value society places on the right at stake and the 
accurate outcome of the case.  For example, each time the Court 
enunciated the standard of proof required in these immigration cases, the 
Court explained why such an “unusually high” standard of proof is 
required: because the rights at stake are fundamental, and because the 
consequences of deportation are “unusually drastic” and “extraordinarily 
severe penalty.”175  The Court has also explained that “[a]ny less exacting 
standard would be inconsistent with the importance of the right[s] . . . at 
stake . . . .”176 
In Mondaca-Vega, however, the court found that the intermediate 
standard sufficiently safeguarded these rights.177  In reaching this 
conclusion, the Court observed that in other cases involving fundamental 
rights, such as in cases terminating parental rights, the Court employs the 
intermediate, “clear and convincing” standard.178  But the Supreme Court 
has made clear that not all fundamental rights are created equal; rather, 
U.S. citizenship is a supremely regarded right.179  This is especially true 
                                                          
 173.   Id. at 420. 
 174.   Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432 (1979); Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654, 660 
(1946). 
 175.   See Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 776 (1988) (noting “the unusually high burden 
of proof in denaturalization cases”); Addington, 441 U.S. at 432 (explaining “the consequences to the 
individual were unusually drastic—loss of citizenship and expulsion from the United States”); Trop 
v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 93 (1958) (plurality opinion) (noting that United States citizenship itself is a 
fundamental right); Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 612 (1949) (“recogniz[ing] the plain fact 
that to deprive a person of his American citizenship is an extraordinarily severe penalty.”). 
 176.   Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 505–06 (1981). 
 177.   Mondaca-Vega, 808 F.3d at 422. 
 178.   Id. 
 179.   See, e.g., Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 64 (1958) (Warren, C.J., dissenting) (observing 
that citizenship is an American’s “most basic right”); Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S 118, 
122 (1943) (observing that citizenship in the United States is “[t]he highest hope of civilized men”). 
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when someone who claims he is a citizen is placed in removal proceedings 
because, with limited exceptions, the Constitution affords no rights to 
noncitizens who are outside of the United States.180  Hence, if an 
immigration judge errantly finds a citizen is an “alien” and he is removed 
from this country, he is not only stripped of his fundamental right to 
citizenship, but he is also stripped of all the other rights afforded by the 
Constitution.  His removal therefore forces him to endure these “drastic 
deprivations,” in addition to “forsak[ing] all bonds formed here and go to 
a foreign land where he often has no contemporary identification.”181  It is 
for these reasons that throughout United States history, courts have 
referred to errant deportation as “a penalty little less dreadful than 
death.”182  In short, contrary to Mondaca-Vega’s reasoning, those whose 
parental rights are terminated simply do not suffer the same deprivation of 
rights as citizens who are banished from their home country. 
Furthermore, in finding the clear and convincing standard was 
adequate, the Mondaca-Vega court did not address an additional function 
that standards serve—the allocation of risk of error among the litigants 
based on the rights at stake.  Citizenship is the bedrock of our Republic; 
“it is U.S. citizens alone who give the government power.”183  And a key 
aspect of self-governance requires that the government cannot lightly take 
away one’s citizenship.184  By allocating almost all of the risk of error to 
the government to prove the person it seeks to remove from the country is 
an “alien,” not a U.S. citizen, the “clear, unequivocal, and convicing” 
standard of proof therefore protects the precious right of citizenship and 
also the structure of our government. 
This section has highlighted the many reasons why Mondaca-Vega 
cannot be reconciled with Supreme Court precedents, the chief reason 
                                                          
 180.   See, e.g., Hernandez v. United States, 785 F.3d 117, 120–21 (5th Cir. 2015), vacated and 
remanded sub. nom Hernandez v. Mesa, 137 S. Ct. 2003 (2017) (finding unarmed, fifteen-year-old 
noncitizen’s parents could not assert constitutional claims after U.S. Border Patrol Agent on U.S. soil 
shot and killed noncitizen standing on Mexican soil); see also Denmore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 521–
22 (2003) (“Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.”). 
 181.   Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285 (1966) (“This Court has not closed its eyes to the drastic 
deprivations that may follow when a resident of this country is compelled by our Government to 
forsake all the bonds formed here and go to a foreign land where he often has no contemporary 
identification.”). 
 182.   See, e.g., Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922) (“To deport one who so claims to 
be a citizen obviously deprives him of liberty, . . . [and] [i]t may result also in loss of both property 
and life, or of all that makes life worth living.” (citations omitted)); Carmichael v. Delaney, 170 F.2d 
239, 245 (9th Cir. 1948) (“Throughout history[,] banishment or exile has been looked upon as a penalty 
little less dreadful than death.”). 
 183.   FIRRP Amicus Brief, supra note 9, at *6. 
 184.   Id. 
592 KANSAS LAW REVIEW Vol. 66 
being that the Court has never limited factfinders to three standards of 
proof.  The Court has repeatedly described the “clear, unequivocal, and 
convincing” standard as the civil equivalent to the reasonable doubt 
standard, which puts a significant distance between it and the “clear and 
convincing” standard on the continuum of proof.  Courts analyzing this 
issue in the future should follow this unbroken line of precedents and 
conclude that the “clear, unequivocal, and convincing” standard is more 
onerous than the “clear and convincing” standard. 
D. Statutory Interpretation 
The “clear, unequivocal, and convincing” and the “clear and 
convincing” standards of proof are both codified in the INA.185  Therefore, 
courts may be presented with the question of whether these standards of 
proof are different in either the context of case law precedent, as both the 
Ward and Mondaca-Vega courts were, or in the context of statutory 
construction.  This section analyzes how courts should resolve this issue 
under the guidance of canons of statutory interpretation.  Importantly, this 
analysis is relevant to both contexts this question may arise in; the 
conclusion a court reaches necessarily impacts the issue in both the case 
law and statutory interpretation contexts. 
The “starting point in every case involving construction of a statute is 
the language itself.”186  Courts therefore assign the plain meaning to every 
word of the statute at issue.187  To determine the plain meaning, canons of 
statutory construction instruct “the use of different words or terms within 
a statute demonstrates that Congress intended to convey a different 
meaning for those words.”188  And “where there is no ambiguity in the 
words, there is no room for [further] construction.”189 
Here, applying these rules of construction show that the “clear, 
unequivocal, and convincing” standard is different than the “clear and 
convincing” standard.  Turning first to the statutory language.  In 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229a(b)(5)(A), Congress requires “clear, unequivocal, and convincing” 
evidence that the noncitizen to being ordered removed in absentia was 
served with written notice and that the noncitizen is removable.190  By 
                                                          
 185.   8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(b)(5)(A), (c)(3)(A) (2012). 
 186.   Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 265 (1981). 
 187.   S.E.C. v. McCarthy, 322 F.3d 650, 656 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 188.   Id. 
 189.   Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 305 (1957), overruled in part by Burks v. United 
States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978). 
 190.   8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(5)(A). 
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contrast, in section 1229a(c)(3)(A), Congress requires the government to 
provide “clear and convincing” evidence that the person it seeks to remove 
is a deportable noncitizen.191  Because Congress used different words 
within the statute to describe the government’s requisite standard of proof 
for different types of proceedings, Congress therefore must have intended 
to convey different standards of proof.192 
To determine the intended stringency of these two standards, a court 
must determine the plain meaning of “unequivocal.”  The INA does not 
define this term.193  The Supreme Court, however, has: “The term 
‘unequivocal,’ taken by itself, means proof that admits of no doubt, a 
burden approximating, if not exceeding, that used in criminal cases.”194  
Given that the Court announced this definition prior to the enactment of 
IIRIRA, courts are to presume Congress was aware of the meaning of 
unequivocal when it incorporated it into the INA.195  Thus, Congress 
intended for the government to meet a higher standard—one that requires 
“unequivocal” evidence—when seeking to remove someone who is absent 
from her removal hearing compared to when it seeks to remove someone 
who is present.  This conclusion is bolstered when considering the core 
function of a standard of proof—to allocate the risk of error based on 
importance of the rights at stake.  And in absentia removal proceedings, 
not only are the precious rights of citizenship and presence in this country 
potentially at stake, so are the absent individual’s due process rights to a 
full and fair hearing. 
To conclude otherwise—that is, to conclude that Congress intended 
for these two standards to carry the same meaning—would require a court 
to write the word “unequivocal” out of the statute.  This would, however, 
violate the cardinal rule to give meaning to every word in the statute.196  
This would also invert the purpose of a standard of proof.  That is, the 
standard of proof would not safeguard the additional rights at stake in an 
individual’s absentia removal proceedings; instead, the same burden of 
proof (and allocation of risk) would apply regardless of whether the 
noncitizen is present.  This result is untenable. 
                                                          
 191.   8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A). 
 192.   See McCarthy, 322 F.3d at 656. 
 193.   See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2012). 
 194.   Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432 (1979). 
 195.   Venetie I.R.A. Council v. Alaska, 944 F.2d 548, 554 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Goodyear 
Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 184–85 (1988)) (“Congress is presumed to be knowledgeable 
about existing law pertinent to any new legislation it enacts”). 
 196.   RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 639, 645 (2012) (citation 
omitted) (quoting D. Ginsberg & Sons, Inc. v. Popkin, 285 U.S. 204, 208 (1932)) (applying the 
“cardinal rule that, if possible, effect shall be given to every clause and part of a statute”). 
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Courts should consider this statutory analysis even if the question of 
whether these standards are different arises from case law, rather than from 
the statutory provisions of the INA because the conclusion a court reaches 
in deciding this question directly impacts the meaning of the standards in 
both contexts.  For example, in Mondaca-Vega, the court declined to 
engage in statutory construction because the “clear, unequivocal, and 
convincing” standard at issue there was “entirely of judicial construct.”197  
But its holding necessarily directs immigration judges to equate the 
standards, even in the statutory context.  That is, immigration judges in the 
Ninth Circuit will now require only “clear and convincing” evidence in 
absentia hearings pursuant to Mondaca-Vega.  Therefore, Mondaca-Vega 
indirectly rewrote the INA’s statutory language.  This too is untenable. 
This section shows that the “clear, unequivocal, and convincing” 
standard in immigration law signifies a third civil standard of proof.  This 
Part shows that separately and together, Supreme Court precedent and the 
INA regard this standard as reasonable doubt’s civil counterpart.  This, in 
addition to the policy concerns addressed in the next Part, seriously calls 
into question the wisdom of the widely held belief that there are only three 
standards of proof. 
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
The previous Part’s analysis of case law and statutory interpretation 
shows that the “clear, unequivocal, and convincing” standard of proof is 
more onerous than the “clear and convincing” standard.  This Part’s 
exploration of policy considerations lends further support to that 
conclusion. 
A. The Detention and Deportation of U.S. Citizens 
Currently, the government is required to establish the alienage of an 
individual in removal proceedings with “clear, unequivocal, and 
convincing” evidence.198  But given that U.S. citizens are commonly 
detained and deported, immigration judges are clearly not requiring the 
government to provide evidence that “does not leave ‘the issue [of 
alienage] in doubt.’”199  Instead, immigration judges, like the court in 
                                                          
 197.   Mondaca-Vega v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 413, 420 (“Our task today is not to apply canons of 
statutory construction; the burden of proof in alienage determination proceedings is entirely a judicial 
construct.”), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 36 (2016). 
 198.   See supra note 118. 
 199.   FIRRP Amicus Brief, supra note 9, at *7, 12 (arguing that the reason U.S. citizens are 
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Mondaca-Vega, appear to view this standard as requiring “highly 
probable” evidence of alienage at best.200  This misunderstanding of the 
standard’s stringency causes severe, often irreparable consequences. 
It is not known with certainty how often the government detains and 
deports U.S. citizens, largely because it goes unreported.201  Still, the 
empirical research of Northwestern professor Jacqueline Stevens and the 
statements of numerous immigration experts all indicate that the U.S. 
government detains and deports citizens on a regular basis.202  Stevens’ 
research, for example, suggests that in 2010, “well over 4,000 U.S. citizens 
were detained or deported as aliens, raising the total since 2003 to more 
than 20,000.”203  Though this research is anecdotal, and even Stevens 
acknowledges that this “figure that may strike some as so high as to lack 
credibility,” numerous other sources, including immigrant rights 
nonprofits and immigration experts, agree with Stevens’ findings.204 
In 2008, for example, immigration expert Kara Hartzler testified to 
Congress that “U.S. citizens are being detained and deported from the 
United States not monthly or weekly, but on a daily basis.”205  Hartzler 
also testified that she saw “40 to 50 cases per month in which individuals 
with potentially valid claims to U.S. citizenship [we]re being detained and 
deported.”206  One of those cases was Thomas Warziniack’s.207 
                                                          
routinely placed in removal proceedings, detained, and deported is because “immigration judges are 
not holding the government to the exacting ‘clear, unequivocal, and convincing’ standard for 
establishing alienage”). 
 200.   Mondaca-Vega, 808 F.3d at 422; see also Problems with ICE Interrogation, Detention, and 
Removal Procedures: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigr., Citizenship, Refugees, Border 
Security and Int’l. L. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 42 (2008) (statement of Kara 
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https://ia600405.us.archive.org/24/items/gov.gpo.fdsys.CHRG-110hhrg40742/CHRG-
110hhrg40742.pdf (“U.S. citizens are being detained and deported from the United States not monthly 
or weekly, but on a daily basis.”). 
 201.   See Stevens, supra note 1, at 618 (observing that the actual number of U.S. citizens deported 
is unknowable due largely to DHS’s policy “not to maintain records of U.S. citizens . . . [it] has 
detained or deported”). 
 202.   See id. at 613 n.17, 618, 630; see also ICE Hearing, supra note 200, at 42 (statement of Kara 
Hartzler, Att’y, Florence Immigrant and Refugee Rights Project); FIRRP Amicus Brief, supra note 9, 
at *12. 
 203.   Stevens, supra note 1 at 608. 
 204.   Id.; FIRRP Amicus Brief, supra note 9, at *19 (“While somewhat less common now than in 
2008, amicus continues to see individuals with potentially valid claims to U.S. citizenship being placed 
in removal proceedings, detained, and deported on a regular basis.”); see also supra note 8 and 
accompanying text. 
 205.   ICE Hearing, supra note 200, at 42 (statement of Kara Hartzler, Att’y, Florence Immigrant 
and Refugee Rights Project). 
 206.   Id. at 40. 
 207.   Id. 
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Thomas was born in Minnesota.208  He has a mental illness and heroin 
addiction.209  After he was arrested on a minor drug charge, he told officers 
that he was a Russian army colonel who was shot and stabbed in 
Afghanistan and that he swam to America from a Russian submarine.210  
Thomas was then placed in removal proceedings.211  Based on this 
testimony, the immigration judge found the government proved Thomas’ 
alienage with “clear, unequivocal, and convincing” evidence, and he was 
transferred to an immigration detention facility in Florence, Arizona.212  
Thomas began “working in the prison kitchen for a dollar a day until he 
had the money to order [a copy of his U.S. birth certificate],” which he 
eventually obtained and used to prove his citizenship with Hartzler’s 
help.213 
Peter Guzman, a U.S. citizen born in California who has limited 
mental capacity, was not able to avoid deportation.214  In 2007, he was 
incarcerated for 40 days on a trespassing charge, during which 
immigration officials “interviewed him and asked if he was a citizen”—
despite having records of his citizenship.215  Peter repeatedly told them he 
was a U.S. citizen.216  He also “complained of hearing voices while in 
custody, and was prescribed anti-psychotic medication.”217  Eventually, 
Peter agreed to the agents’ insistence that he was actually born in Mexico, 
like his parents were.218  After Peter signed a voluntary departure order, he 
was placed on a bus with $3 and taken to Tijuana.219  There, he survived 
for three months by eating out of garbage cans.220  Peter’s mother went to 
Tijuana to find him; “[w]hen her money ran out after three days, she slept 
                                                          
 208.   FIRRP Amicus Brief, supra note 9, at *18. 
 209.   Id. 
 210.   Id. 
 211.   Id. 
 212.   Id. 
 213.   Id. at *19. 
 214.   Id. at *22–23. 
 215.   Id. at *22; see also ICE Hearing, supra note 200 at 30 (statement of James J. Brosnahan, 
Senior Partner, Morrison & Foerster, LLP) (Mr. Guzman’s attorney testified to Congress that “[t]hey 
had . . . [evidence of Mr. Guzman’s citizenship] in their computers, but they didn’t look, evidently, so 
they say.”). 
 216.   FIRRP Amicus Brief, supra note 9, at *22. 
 217.   Id. at *23. 
 218.   Id.; see also ICE Hearing, supra note 200, at 30 (statement of James J. Brosnahan, Senior 
Partner, Morrison & Foerster, LLP) (“And [the interviewing agent] said, But your parents were born 
in Mexico, you can’t be a citizen, and sent him back to a holding cell and then brought him back 
again.”). 
 219.   FIRRP Amicus Brief, supra note 9, at *23. 
 220.   Id. 
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in the closet-sized backroom of a banana warehouse, where she was 
allowed to stay in exchange for cooking for the warehouse 
workers . . . .”221 
Mark Lyttle, whose errant deportation to Mexico was discussed in the 
Introduction, Thomas, and Peter’s experiences are indicative of the 
demographic of people who are most susceptible to errant detention and 
deportation: They belong to racial and ethnic minorities, or are mentally 
ill, homeless, or indigent.222 
By employing a standard of proof that requires “unequivocal” 
evidence of alienage—evidence that does not leave the issue of alienage 
“in doubt”—rather than evidence of alienage that is only “highly 
probable,” the occurrence of the U.S. government’s detention and 
deportation of its citizens would decrease, likely dramatically.  This higher 
standard would also signal to the government that more compelling proof 
of alienage is required; this too would likely curtail the government’s 
initial placement of citizens in removal proceedings.  Also, requiring a 
standard greater than “clear and convincing” would further safeguard the 
rights of the vulnerable populations who are most often errantly detained 
and deported.  Further, given that alienage determinations are subject to 
limited review on appeal, a heightened standard protects the precious right 
of citizenship that is at stake.223  Finally, a more onerous standard of proof 
that allocates almost all of the risk of error to the government to prove the 
individual is an “alien” would signal to the factfinder how supremely 
important it is to society that judges order only noncitizens removed.  For 
these reasons, immigration courts should view the “clear, unequivocal, and 
convincing” standard as requiring higher proof of alienage than the “clear 
and convincing” standard.224 
B. The Implicit Biases of Immigration Judges 
Requiring “clear, unequivocal, and convincing” evidence of 
alienage—that is, evidence that does not leave the issue in doubt—will 
further protect the countless, vulnerable citizens errantly placed in removal 
                                                          
 221.   Id. 
 222.   Id. at *19. 
 223.   See, e.g., Mondaca-Vega v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 413, 417 (9th Cir. 2015) (“The petitioner argues 
we must review the [lower] court’s findings [of alienage] de novo.  We hold, instead, that the ‘clear 
error’ standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) applies.”), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 36 (2016). 
 224.   These reasons also underscore why immigration judges should regard this standard as 
requiring heightened proof when ordering an individual removed in absentia under 8 U.S.C. § 
1229a(b)(5)(A) (2012). 
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proceedings from the well-documented implicit biases of immigration 
judges. 
Implicit biases—also termed “hidden” and “unconscious” biases—are 
“bits of knowledge” our brains store about social groups after having 
frequently encountered them.225  “Once lodged in our minds, hidden biases 
can influence our behavior toward members of particular social groups, 
but we remain oblivious to their influence.”226  For example, “[w]hen the 
brain has to process large volumes of information quickly, there is a 
tendency to rely on experiences rather than on unique details in the 
present.”227  When judging people in this strained state, the brain falls back 
on the “bits of knowledge” it has stored regarding generalizations about 
race, age, country of origin, religion or gender, rather than evaluating that 
particular individual.228  Thus, implicit bias against groups of people is 
subjective, “largely automatic, and occurs below the level of conscious 
awareness,” making it difficult for the individual harboring the bias to 
identify and nearly impossible for others to identify.229  Indeed, even 
though we all harbor implicit biases, “most people find it unbelievable that 
their behavior can be guided by mental content of which they are 
unaware.”230 
Research shows that in judicial decision-making, most judges are able 
to suppress their implicit biases, which prevents bias from clouding their 
decisions.231  But this is not necessarily true of immigration judges, largely 
due to the conditions that immigration judges work under—“fast paced, 
high pressure and culturally charged.”232  Experts say that these conditions, 
coupled with the fact high cognitive loads yield more mistakes make 
misjudgments “all but inevitable.”233 
In 2011, Professor Fatma Marouf examined the effect of implicit bias 
on immigration judges and the BIA.234  Drawing on her novel research, 
                                                          
 225.   MAHZARIN R. BANAJI & ANTHONY G. GREENWALD, BLIND SPOT: HIDDEN BIASES OF GOOD 
PEOPLE xii (2013). 
 226.   Id. 
 227.   Caitlin Dickerson, How U.S. Immigration Judges Battle Their Own Prejudice, N.Y. TIMES 
(Oct. 4, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/05/us/us-immigration-judges-bias.html. 
 228.   Id. 
 229.   Michele Benedetto, Crisis on the Immigration Bench, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 467, 483 (2008); 
Fatma E. Marouf, Implicit Bias and Immigration Courts, 45 NEW ENG. L. REV. 417, 418 (2011) 
[hereinafter Marouf, Implicit Bias]. 
 230.   BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note 225. 
 231.   Marouf, Implicit Bias, supra note 229, at 428. 
 232.   Dickerson, supra note 227. 
 233.   Id. 
 234.   Marouf, Implicit Bias, supra note 229. 
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she concluded that immigration judges are especially prone to implicit bias 
because they: (1) do not have the “structural and professional norms to 
remain impartial and independent”; (2) have limited opportunities to 
engage in deliberate thinking; (3) have low motivation resulting from high 
levels of stress and burnout; (4) must decide legally and factually complex 
cases; and (5) make decisions that are often subjected to limited review by 
the BIA and federal courts of appeal.235  Each of these factors further 
highlights the need for imposing a heightened evidentiary burden on the 
government when establishing alienage. 
First, the structure of immigration judgeships raises concerns over 
immigration judges’ ability to be impartial and independent.  Unlike 
federal judges who derive their authority from Article III of the 
Constitution and enjoy the independence that accompanies a lifetime 
appointment, almost all immigration judges are appointed after serving 
long careers within the Department of Justice, prosecuting immigration 
cases.236  And even as immigration judges, their autonomy remains 
inhibited; immigration judges still answer to the Attorney General who 
appointed them.237  In addition to lacking genuine independence, 
immigration judges are permitted to interrogate, examine, and cross-
examine witnesses.238  Thus, with over forty percent of individuals in 
removal unrepresented,239 an immigration judge can easily abuse his or her 
authority. 
An immigration judge’s neutrality is especially worrisome “when one 
considers that respondents in removal proceedings do not have any of the 
protections against bias that characterize criminal trials, such as voir dire 
and peremptory strikes, although deportation is akin to criminal 
punishment in its severity.”240  And as Marouf correctly notes, “[t]he lack 
of genuine independence of [immigration judges], coupled with their 
inquisitorial role, creates a situation where the guidelines for appropriate 
behavior are unclear, which allows implicit bias to go unchecked and 
contributes to discrimination in deciding cases.”241 
                                                          
 235.   Id. at 429–41. 
 236.   Id. at 429; Benedetto, supra note 229, at 472. 
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Furthermore, when an individual’s implicit and explicit beliefs 
conflict, the implicit belief becomes the “default,” and the explicit belief 
can override the implicit only if the individual has the cognitive capacity 
available to do so.242  And given that immigration judges are extremely 
overworked, they face severe burnout, low motivation, exhaustion, and 
even depression.243  An average immigration judge handles over 1,800 
cases per year, more than three times the average caseload of federal 
judges.244  Some immigration judges have as many as 6,000 cases each.245  
One judge on the Arlington Immigration Court is described as having to 
decide twenty-six cases before lunch—spending only seven minutes per 
case.246  And this is actually an improvement.247 
Because immigration law itself is known to be extremely complex in 
nature—both legally and factually—these conditions that immigration 
judges must decide cases in “all encourage reliance on intuition, rather 
than conscious, deliberative thought, which takes more time and energy,” 
making it harder, if not impossible, to suppress implicit bias.248  This is 
especially true in the context of discretionary decisions, such as credibility, 
which are subject to extremely limited review by the BIA and circuit 
court.249  As background, when the government provides prima facie 
                                                          
 242.   Id. at 431. 
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evidence of an individual’s alleged alienage, the burden shifts to the 
individual to provide evidence of citizenship.250  But if the judge does not 
find the individual credible, his citizenship evidence is severely 
discounted.251  Thus, a judge’s alienage finding often rests on the 
individual’s credibility, not on the sufficiency of the government’s 
evidence.252  And on appeal, the immigration judge’s credibility finding is 
protected by the deferential “clear error” standard of review.253 
These factors all make immigration judges particularly susceptible to 
implicit bias.254  Indeed, numerous case studies and court decisions 
confirm that implicit bias is a problem particularly among the immigration 
bench.255  And in the context of alienage determinations, an immigration 
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judge’s implicit bias can create in an insurmountable hurdle for a citizen, 
especially if that citizen is unrepresented, a minority, or mentally ill.256 
Therefore, by requiring the government to prove alienage with “clear, 
unequivocal, and convincing” evidence—a more onerous standard than 
the “clear and convincing” standard—the rights of U.S. citizens errantly 
placed in removal proceedings will more adequately safeguarded from 
these implicit biases, thereby reducing the occurrence of deported U.S. 
citizens. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article challenged the widely held belief that there are only three 
standards of proof—two for civil proceedings, and one for criminal.  It 
analyzed immigration law’s “clear, unequivocal, and convincing” 
standard under Supreme Court precedent, statutory interpretation, and 
policy considerations.  From this, the Article concluded that the “clear, 
unequivocal, and convincing” standard signifies a third civil standard of 
proof, one that is more stringent than the intermediate “clear and 
convincing” standard.  Thus, this Article represents an initial effort to 
reshape the existing view of standards of proof; rather than restricting 
factfinders to a defined set of standards of proof, courts and scholars 
should be guided by the Supreme Court’s emphasis that standards of proof 
exist on a continuum. 
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